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In his essay “Congressional Authority to Interpret the Thirteenth Amendment,”1 Alex
Tsesis has responded to my article, “The Scope of Congress‟s Thirteenth Amendment
Enforcement Power After City of Boerne v. Flores.”2 I hope to take this opportunity to further
that dialogue, clarifying my own position and challenging Professor Tsesis‟s arguments where
necessary. Despite our disagreements, I believe we share a common purpose, namely, to provide
useful and constitutionally sound guidance for Congress in the exercise of its Thirteenth
Amendment enforcement power. I conclude this piece by suggesting some areas that are ripe for
further exploration in pursuit of that goal.

I.

The Section Two Power: Three Models
At the outset, let me summarize the context, inquiry, and arguments of my earlier article.

Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment gives Congress the power “to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.”3 Since the Civil Rights Cases in 1883, the Supreme Court has
maintained that this provision empowers Congress not simply to pass laws outlawing slavery and
involuntary servitude, but “to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and
incidents of slavery in the United States.”4 In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Court invoked
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this “canonical” language5 and expanded upon it, stating that Congress has “the power …
rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, [as well as] the authority
to translate that determination into effective legislation.”6
Jones was part of a trio of Warren Court decisions that confirmed a generous
understanding of Congress‟s power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. In each of those
cases, the Court held that McCulloch v. Maryland provided the basic test for measuring the
propriety of congressional enactments,7 and that “all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to [a “legitimate”] end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and
spirit of the constitution,” are constitutional.8 Jones arguably went further, giving Congress
discretion not only to determine what means are appropriate to enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment, but arguably also to define for itself the legitimate ends of legislation, i.e., the
badges and incidents of slavery. As George Rutherglen has described, Jones expanded “the
legitimate ends under the [Thirteenth Amendment] . . . from abolition of slavery to eliminating
the consequences of slavery, with a concomitant increase in the appropriate means that Congress
could choose to reach those ends.”9
As a doctrinal matter, the viability of Jones is in question in light of City of Boerne v.
Flores. In that case, the Supreme Court substantially altered its approach to evaluating
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation. The Court clarified that the enforcement power
conferred upon Congress is “‟remedial‟” in nature and does not permit Congress to “decree the
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substance of the Fourteenth Amendment‟s restrictions on the States.”10 In addition to pure
remedial legislation, the Court also preserved space for Congress to act prophylactically by
“prohibit[ing] conduct which is not itself unconstitutional.”11 However, the Court made clear
that it will measure the propriety of prophylactic Fourteenth Amendment legislation by asking
whether there is “a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end.”12
City of Boerne’s decidedly non-deferential approach in evaluating Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement legislation is clearly in tension with Jones‟s extremely deferential
approach, even though the enforcement provisions of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments are virtually identical.13 Rather than simply assume that City of Boerne spells the
end for Jones, however, I decided to undertake a de novo assessment of the Section Two power.
Just as City of Boerne was based in part on the Court‟s reading of the Fourteenth Amendment‟s
drafting history and in part on the structural values of separation of powers and federalism, I set
out to evaluate the proper scope of the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power based on that
Amendment‟s own unique history, also informed by separation of powers and federalism
principles.
I suggested three ways to conceptualize the breadth of the Section Two power: First, as a
direct or “pure” enforcement power to “proscribe, prevent, or „remedy‟” conduct that
independently violates Section One.14 Second, as a “prophylactic” power to target an
identifiable subset of civil rights violations -- the badges and incidents of slavery -- as a means of
10
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preventing the reimposition of slavery or involuntary servitude. And third, as a broad,
“substantive” power to define outright as well as eradicate the badges and incidents of slavery. I
concluded that a combination of the “pure” and “prophylactic” readings of the Section Two
power best comports with the text and history of the amendment as well as structural
constitutional values. The third, “substantive” approach finds little, if any, support in the
Amendment‟s text, history, or structure.
Professor Tsesis suggests that I believe that Section Two does not convey on Congress
any meaningful power to protect civil rights. This is not an accurate characterization of my
position. Rather, I believe that Jones – and the Civil Rights Cases – were correct in ruling that
Section Two permits Congress to pass not only “pure” enforcement legislation, but also
legislation that addresses the badges and incidents of slavery. This latter type of legislation is
prophylactic in the sense that it concerns conduct that does not independently violate Section
One of the Thirteenth Amendment, but instead infringes on certain core civil rights. Moreover, I
believe that Jones was correct in holding that courts owe McCulloch-style deference to the
means by which Congress decides to attack the badges and incidents of slavery. The principal
sponsors of the Amendment as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1866 clearly understood
McCulloch to apply in the Section Two context.15
However, in my view, Jones was wrong to assign to Congress the substantive power to
define the badges and incidents of slavery on its own, subject only to bare-bones rationality
review. The historical record contains no evidence to support placing such a substantive power
in Congress‟s hands. The concept of the badges and incidents of slavery is not susceptible to
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open-ended interpretation, but rather refers to an identifiable set of public and perhaps private
practices.16 Allowing Congress to label a particular practice a badge and incident of slavery
without meaningful supervision by the courts is also problematic from the perspectives of
separation of powers and federalism. It is not at all clear that the judiciary can validly convey an
aspect of the judicial power to Congress by giving Congress power to define the ends of the
Thirteenth Amendment legislation, i.e., the badges and incidents of slavery. Moreover, giving
Congress wide and largely unreviewable discretion to define the badges and incidents of slavery
provides incentives for Congress to regulate conduct traditionally governed by the states.
Accordingly, in my earlier piece I concluded that:
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment is best read to give Congress broad
discretion over the means by which the Thirteenth Amendment is implemented,
but more limited discretion with respect to its proper ends. In passing prophylactic
legislation, Congress cannot define the badges and incidents of slavery for itself,
as Jones suggested, but rather must operate within the boundaries of the concept
as understood through history and interpreted by the courts. Thus, Congress‟s
discretion is limited to determining which badges and incidents of slavery it will
address and how to address them. While courts should defer to the remedial
aspects of Congress‟s actions, they should review actively the ends of such
prophylactic legislation. Implemented in this way, the Thirteenth Amendment‟s
enforcement power will be sufficiently vigorous to allow Congress to enact core
race-based civil rights protections. At the same time, though, this reading will
cabin efforts to transform the Thirteenth Amendment into a source of wideranging federal power. 17
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II.

The Section Two Power: Three Points of Contention
A. Section Two and the Ratification Debates
Professor Tsesis is a strong defender of Jones‟s approach to the Section Two power, and

has suggested in other writings that Section Two provides “a means for enforcing [the nation‟s]
foundational principles of liberty and general wellbeing.”18 In his response to my piece, he
grounds that approach in part in the Thirteenth Amendment‟s ratification debates, arguing that
“[m]any of the congressional speeches on the proposed Thirteenth Amendment evidence a clear
understanding that the enforcement clause would expand legislative authority into matters that
had previously been reserved to the states,”19 and that through such legislation, Congress could
“punish any private and public infringement against inalienable freedoms.”20
In fact, the members of the Thirty-Eighth Congress were quite unclear about the scope of
Congress‟s power under the proposed Section Two. The quotes that Professor Tsesis uses to
support his position do not reference the function of Section Two or the appropriate role of
Congress in enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment. Representative James Wilson noted that
“human equality” was the “sublime creed” of the 1776 Revolution, and that the new republic
promised that “the poor, the humble, the sons of toil . . . were the peers, the equals, before the
law.”21 While Wilson identified slavery as the enemy of the Republic and urged passage of the
Thirteenth Amendment as the way to “obliterate the last lingering vestiges of the slave
system,”22 nowhere in that speech (or any other speech during the ratification process) did he

18

Alexander Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom: Civil Rights & the Thirteenth Amendment, 45 B.C. L. REV.
307, 309 (2004). See also ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 121
(2004) (suggesting that Section Two would empower Congress to provide a “federal guarantee to marry the partner
of one‟s choice”).
19
Tsesis, supra note 1, at 4.
20
Id. at 6.
21
See Tsesis, supra note 1, at 5 & n.19 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1319 (1864)).
22
CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1324 (1864).

6

make specific reference to Congress‟s power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment, much less
explicate the scope of that power.
Similarly, Representative Isaac Arnold stated that the agony of the Civil War would lead
to the birth of a “new nation [which] is to be wholly free. Liberty, equality before the law is to
be the great corner-stone.”23 He recognized that “[m]uch yet remains to be done to secure” the
new nation, and urged passage of the Thirteenth Amendment as a central way to “consummate
this grand revolution.24 His lofty rhetoric, however, made no mention of the Section Two power
specifically, or the role of Congress more generally.
There in fact was some specific discussion regarding Section Two in the congressional
ratification debates, but it is not possible to draw from those statements any clear conclusions
regarding the precise scope of Congress‟s power. Among supporters of the amendment, Senator
Lyman Trumbull and Representative Chilton White both suggested that the scope of the Section
Two power was akin to that conferred by the Necessary and Proper Clause.25 While this power,
as explicated in McCulloch v. Maryland,26 gives Congress substantial latitude as to the means by
which the amendment should be enforced, it does not answer the related question as to what the
legitimate ends of enforcement legislation should be, i.e., what the scope of the right conveyed
by Section One of the Amendment is. Indeed, Senator Trumbull indicated a limited view on that
latter question, stating that the effect of the amendment was to “ri[d] the country of slavery.”27
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Conversely, other supporters of the amendment, like Senator James Harlan, took a broad view of
the rights conveyed by Section One,28 but did not explicitly anticipate any role for Congress in
enforcing those rights.29
Congressional opponents of the amendment took a much broader view of the power
Section Two would convey. They predicted that Congress would use its power to “declare all
State laws based on [blacks‟] political inequality with the white races null and void,”30 to “invade
any State to enforce the freedom of the African, . . . [will elevate] the African to the august rights
of citizenship . . . [and will] strik[e] down the corner-stone of the Republic, the local sovereignty
of the States,”31 and to guarantee “the freed negro the right of franchise.”32
The lack of clarity during the congressional ratification debates with respect to the
function of Section Two – and even the precise scope of the right conveyed by Section One – is
understandable. As Earl Maltz and Michael Vorenberg have both noted, the primary focus of the
ratification debates was universal emancipation. That focus “did not require a definition of
slavery in the abstract or a description of the difference between „slavery‟ and „freedom‟ at the
margins.”33 “Republicans . . . were interested mainly in eliminating the institution of slavery
that had caused the war. And because few of them were able to envision a time without war,
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they saw no urgency in codifying the rights of freedom for the postwar Union.”34 While
understandable, though, the lack of sharp focus on the Section Two power renders the
congressional ratification debates an unhelpful source for determining the intended function and
scope of that power.
The states‟ ratification debates might be a better source of information. It is not entirely
surprising that Section Two attracted more attention in that states than in Congress. The
amendment‟s opponents charged that Section Two would give Congress “unlimited power,”35
and permit it to “rewrite state constitutions or abolish state courts and state legislatures,”36
overturn discriminatory state laws,37 and legislate “over the Negroes, and white men, too, after
the abolishment of slavery.”38
Even more important than opposition views, however, are the views of the states that
ratified the amendment, particularly South Carolina, Alabama and Louisiana. South Carolina
was the first of these to ratify, although it issued a declaration stating that “any attempt by
Congress toward legislating upon the political status of former slaves, or their civil relations,
would be contrary to the Constitution of the United States as it now is, or as it would be altered
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by the proposed amendment.”39 Alabama and Louisiana issued similar reservations as they
ratified the Amendment.40 Because other states ultimately voted to ratify the Thirteenth
Amendment, the precise legal effect of these reservations is unclear. However, their relevance to
determining the original understanding or public meaning of Section Two is certainly probative.
As George Rutherglen has observed, “[i]f the marginal states most reluctant to ratify had
determined the meaning of the amendment, then it would have granted Congress hardly any
enforcement powers at all.”41
All in all, the Thirteenth Amendment ratification debates are of limited utility on the
precise question of Congress‟s power under Section Two. While it is undoubtedly true that
Section Two “expand[ed] legislative authority” into some “matters that had previously been
reserved to the states,”42 neither the congressional nor state debates explored meaningfully the
precise contours of that power or resolved definitively that Congress could “punish any private
and public infringement of inalienable freedoms.”43
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1866
Of course, the ratification debates are not the only source of historic reflection on the
scope of the Section Two power. Professor Tsesis assumes that the debates regarding the Civil
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Rights Act of 1866 are relevant to determining the original meaning of Section Two.44 While I
am somewhat ambivalent about the relevance of these subsequent debates,45 I am more interested
here in discussing Professor Tsesis‟s contention that “[t]he breadth of the power Congress
defined for itself through the Civil Rights Act of 1866 unequivocally signaled the creation of
congressional plenary power over human rights safeguards.”46
There is no question that the ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments effected a
massive shift in federal-state relations, particularly with respect to protecting the rights of the
newly freed slaves. However, the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the first piece of
enforcement legislation, does not come anywhere close to proving “congressional plenary power
over human rights safeguards.” Tsesis‟s breathtakingly broad assertion on this point is belied by
the substance of the Act itself, the congressional debates on the Act, and the subsequent
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Passed to vitiate the southern Black Codes, the 1866 Act provided, inter alia, that
all citizens shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the
United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.47
To be sure, the Act secured a core set of rights for the freed slaves – rights essential for
participation in civil society. At the same time, the rights conveyed were by no means a
complete set of civil or human rights safeguards as we might understand them today. Indeed,
supporters of the Act made clear that they had no intention of extending “social” or “political”
44
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rights to the freed slaves.48 Thus, while the 1866 Act was groundbreaking in the sense that it was
the first piece of federal legislation to displace state laws in the name of protecting the rights of a
racial minority, it stopped well short of safeguarding all civil or human rights.
There was heated debate over the Civil Rights Act of 1866, one principal focus of which
was the question whether Section Two was a sufficient source of power for its passage.
Supporters argued that the Act was necessary and proper legislation to secure the freedom
conveyed by Section One. The Act‟s principal sponsor, Senator Lyman Trumbull,
acknowledged that he had been unclear during the ratification debates about the power conveyed
by Section Two,49 but now argued that Section Two gave Congress the power “to pass all laws
necessary to give effect to the provision making all persons free.”50 Toward the end of
effectuating the freedom conveyed by Section One, Trumbull argued that Congress could
displace laws, like the Black Codes, “that prevented the colored man going from home, that did
not allow him to buy or to sell, or to make contracts; that did not allow him to own property; that
did not allow him to enforce rights; that did not allow him to be educated.”51 Such legal
restraints were the “incidents to slavery” and the “badges of servitude.”52 Representative James
Wilson, the House sponsor who aligned himself with Trumbull, clarified that Congress‟s power
to address the Black Codes was prophylactic in nature: “A man who enjoys the civil rights
48
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mentioned in this bill cannot be reduced to slavery.”53 Representative Burton Cook echoed this
idea, stating that the civil rights bill was necessary legislation because persons denied the rights
protected by the act “are not secured in the rights of freedom.”54 Accordingly, supporters of the
Act did not assert that Section Two granted power to safeguard all civil or human rights, but
rather offered a more modest view that the Section Two empowered Congress to protect the
subset of civil rights that necessarily inhered in the freedom granted by Section One.
Opponents of the 1866 Act generally asserted that Section Two permitted only “pure”
enforcement legislation and that the rights guaranteed by the proposed Act went well beyond
what was “appropriate” to enforce Section One. In the words of Representative Samuel
Marshall, “Congress has acquired not a particle of additional power other than [the literal freeing
of slaves] by virtue of this amendment.”55 Senator Cowan found that Section Two empowered
Congress only to break “the bond by which the negro slave was held to his master” and gave “the
Negro the privilege of the habeas corpus, that is, if anybody persisted in the face of the
constitutional amendment in holding him as a slave, that he should have an appropriate remedy
to be delivered.”56
One of the bill‟s most notable opponents was Representative John Bingham who, unlike
most opponents, was sympathetic to the bill‟s goals.57 However, Bingham argued that Section
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Two was an insufficient source of congressional power to displace discriminatory state laws in
light of the residual police power of the states protected by the Tenth Amendment.58 He
therefore argued in favor of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment as a much more solid basis for
displacing discriminatory state laws.59
Even if one assumes that the final passage of the 1866 Act over President Johnson‟s veto
demonstrates that a supermajority of the Thirty-Ninth Congress believed Section Two was an
adequate basis for the Act, subsequent events suggest that Representative Bingham‟s arguments
left at least some lingering uncertainty as to the scope of the Section Two power. In short order,
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 reenacted under
Congress‟s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.60 Indeed, Senator Luke Poland, who
voted for the 1866 Act, noted that “[t]he power of Congress to [pass the Civil Rights Act of
1866] has been doubted and denied by persons entitled to high consideration.”61 He argued that
the proposed Fourteenth Amendment was therefore important because it would remove “doubt . .
. as to the power of Congress to enforce principles lying at the very foundation of all republican
government.”62
Professor Tsesis directs our attention to the statements of the Act‟s principal sponsor,
Senator Trumbull, “perhaps the best person for explaining the meaning of the Thirteenth
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Amendment because he had been the chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.”63
Putting aside the fact that Trumbull failed to articulate a view of the Section Two power during
the actual ratification debates and denied during the debates on the Act that it reached “political
rights,”64 Trumbull‟s statements subsequent to the passage of the 1866 Act belie the claim that he
understood Section Two to convey plenary power over human rights. In early debates65
regarding what would become the Civil Rights Act of 1875, Trumbull stated that the 1866 Act
“went to the verge of constitutional authority” by giving the freed slaves “the rights that belong
to the individual as man and as a freeman under the Constitution of the United States.”66 He
opposed early versions of the 1875 Act that barred racial discrimination in schooling and
transportation, arguing that such guarantees pertained to “political” or “social” rights over which
Congress lacked the power to legislate.67 Accordingly, it is clear that even the sponsor of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 did not understand Section Two to convey, or the Act to assert, plenary
power over human rights safeguards, as we would understand them today.
Ultimately, one may conclude (as, incidentally, I do) that Section Two in fact provided an
adequate basis for the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. However, I find it quite difficult
to agree with the additional proposition that passage of the Act “unequivocally signaled the
creation of congressional plenary power over human rights safeguards.”68 The history outlined
above is one of, if not equivocation, at least manifest unease regarding the constitutional basis
for the Act and reservations about the extent of the Section Two power. At most, supporters of
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the bill believed that Section Two permitted Congress to safeguard core civil rights as a means of
ensuring and protecting Section One‟s grant of freedom.

C. Structural Considerations and the Relevance of the Fourteenth Amendment
In addition to the historical record, structural values of separation of powers and
federalism bear heavily on how to interpret the scope of the Section Two power. Professor
Tsesis claims that City of Boerne‟s analytical framework is inapposite – and therefore that my
willingness to consider some of the structural principles that undergirded that opinion is
misplaced – because there is a key “analytical distinction between the Fourteenth and Thirteenth
Amendments,” namely, that the former addresses only state action while the latter addresses both
state and private action.69 While this difference between the amendments is undoubtedly true, I
do not believe it bears on the question whether federalism and separation of powers -constitutionally-based metavalues that coexist with the Constitution‟s rights-granting provisions
-- are relevant to the analysis of the Section Two power.
Separation of powers, particularly the relative roles of Congress and the federal courts in
determining the substance of constitutional rights, played a major role in City of Boerne. There,
the Court clarified that the power to “enforce” the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment is a
“remedial” power that does not permit Congress to “determine what constitutes a constitutional
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violation.”70 Judicial supremacy, while controversial,71 is an “indispensable feature of our
constitutional system,” 72 that is grounded in both theory and a long line of caselaw that
designates the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution.73
Jones creates space for the same type of institutional clash that the Court confronted in
City of Boerne by permitting Congress essentially to define the scope of its own power by
resolving the substantive meaning of the badges and incidents of slavery. Others have
recognized the broad potential effect of placing such substantive definitional power in the hands
of Congress. As Larry Tribe has put it, Jones conveys a power to “define the infringement of
[any] righ[t] as a form of domination or subordination and thus an aspect of slavery, and
proscribe such infringement as a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.”74 George Rutherglen
characterized Jones as expanding “the legitimate ends under the [Thirteenth Amendment] . . .
from abolition of slavery to eliminating the consequences of slavery.”75
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There is certainly an argument to be made that placing such substantive power in
Congress‟s hands is appropriate in the Thirteenth Amendment context. Larry Sager has argued
that Section One is a judicially underenforced constitutional norm, the potential coverage of
which is substantially greater than the Court‟s limited holdings regarding the scope of Section
1‟s self-executing right.76 Accordingly, Congress might be uniquely well-positioned to have an
interpretive role in enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment.77 From this perspective, one can
understand Jones as creating space for “an important and productive constitutional dialectic
between coequal and coordinate federal branches.”78
Conversely, it is reasonable to note the tension between Jones and City of Boerne and
question the propriety of empowering Congress to define the badges and incidents of slavery for
itself. It is possible that the Section One right is not judicially underenforced at all, and therefore
that by placing such substantive power in Congress‟s hands, Jones cedes a core aspect of the
judicial power to Congress. The “prophylactic” understanding of the Section Two power for
which I advocate – in which Congress develops, and the Court meaningfully reviews, the factual
and historical record for identifying particular conduct as a badge and incident of slavery –
safeguards the Supreme Court‟s role as the final arbiter of the meaning of Section One of the
Thirteenth Amendment while respecting Congress‟s superior fact-finding capacity regarding the
effects of certain discriminatory conduct.
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With respect to federalism, the particular concerns that have informed the Court‟s postBoerne cases (from Garrett and Kimel to Hibbs and Lane) are not present in the Thirteenth
Amendment context, as Congress has not attempted to use Section Two power to abrogate a
state‟s sovereign immunity. However, this does not mean that federalism is irrelevant to the
Section Two calculus. By permitting Congress to define the badges and incidents of slavery,
Jones put its imprimatur on a power of near-plenary proportions that could permit Congress to
attack any form of discrimination against any group. This conception of the Section Two power
carries substantial federalism costs.
Jones has given rise to a cottage industry of labeling various injustices as badges and
incidents of slavery. Most commentators and litigants have focused on aspects of race-based
discrimination,79 although many have gone beyond race, claiming that everything from
municipal lawn mowing ordinances,80 to sealed adoption records,81 to human cloning,82 to
restrictions on reproductive rights,83 to sex discrimination84 and sexual harassment,85 to
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discrimination against gay people86 are badges and incidents of slavery. By indicating that
Congress would have wide latitude to regulate such a vast array of injustices and discriminatory
conduct, Jones created a Thirteenth Amendment-specific federalism concern, namely, that
Congress could attempt to utilize the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power as a general
police power.87
Professor Tsesis claims that I argue that the Thirteenth Amendment did not “alter
federalism substantially enough to make civil rights a national rather than state prerogative.”88
That is not my position. Rather, I agree that Section Two gives Congress the power to protect
core civil rights as a prophylactic measure against the reimposition of slavery and involuntary
servitude. I simply contend that Section Two does not give Congress plenary power to regulate
conduct far removed from the oppression of slavery and its immediate aftermath. There is a
substantial difference between reading Section Two as creating a strong, focused federal power
and reading it as creating an undifferentiated police power. Acknowledging the relevance of
federalism helps in the effort to strike a proper balance.

III.

The Section Two Power: Three Areas for Exploration
Perhaps the most valuable function of this dialogue with Professor Tsesis is to underscore

the need for further exploration and debate regarding Congress‟s role in enforcing the Thirteenth
Amendment. Although there is some very fine literature on Section Two,89 there is space for
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more. In this final section, I suggest three related areas that might be ripe for additional
scholarly reflection.

A. What are the badges and incidents of slavery?
The concept of the “badges and incidents of slavery” has been the touchstone for
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement legislation since the Civil Rights Cases. However, there is
no widely accepted definition of that concept, or even its outer boundaries. The Civil Rights
Cases indicated that the concept applied only to discriminatory public laws like the Black Codes
and specifically rejected the suggestion that private acts of race discrimination in public
accommodations constituted badges and incidents of slavery. Jones essentially overruled the
Civil Rights Cases on this point, acquiescing in Congress‟s determination that private acts of race
discrimination in property transactions were badges and incidents of slavery.
Since Jones, courts and commentators have asserted that a wide range of conduct can be
deemed a badge and incident of slavery.90 However, only a few scholars have reflected on this
category at a more conceptual level.91 Deeper exploration of the meaning of the “badges and
incidents of slavery” is essential to help Congress identify future subjects for Thirteenth
Amendment legislation. Questions for reflection might include whether the concept of the
CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT, at 172 (Tsesis ed., 2010); Rutherglen, supra note
5; TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 18; Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom, supra note 18;
Rebecca Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 255 (2010).
90
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slavery is any public or private act of “discrimination and subordination” aimed at African Americans, which
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previous condition of servitude, that mimics the law of slavery and that has significant potential to lead to the de
facto reenslavement or legal subjugation of the targeted group”).
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badges and incidents of slavery: (1) limits what populations Congress may protect under its
Section Two power; (2) permits Congress to address private as well as public action; (3) requires
a historical link between modern conduct and the legal treatment of slaves; and (4) requires a
causal link between modern conduct and a state of actual slavery or involuntary servitude.

B. What modern-day applications does the Section Two power have?
Since the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Congress has passed a fair amount of Section Two
legislation, most of which I would characterize as “pure” enforcement legislation.92 Laws aimed
explicitly at the badges and incidents are far fewer in number, although the most recent piece of
Thirteenth Amendment legislation falls in this category.93 The Matthew Shepard and James
Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, signed in October 2009, provides criminal penalties for
willfully injuring another because of – among other things94 – that person‟s “actual or perceived
race, color, religion, or national origin.”95 This particular provision was explicitly justified in
Thirteenth Amendment terms:
Slavery and involuntary servitude were enforced, both prior to and after the
adoption of the 13th amendment to the Constitution of the United States, through
widespread public and private violence directed at persons because of their race,
color, or ancestry, or perceived race, color, or ancestry. Accordingly, eliminating

92

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2000) (criminalizing peonage); id. §§ 1585-1588 (2000) (outlawing slave trade); id.
§ 1584 (prohibiting involuntary servitude); id. § 1589 (penalizing forced labor); id. § 1590 (penalizing human
trafficking); id. § 1591 (penalizing sex trafficking). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2000) (imposing civil remedies for
peonage).
93
See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19; 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) (hate crimes committed while victim
is using public facility).
94
Other parts of the law bar violence based on “gender, sexual orientation, gender identity or disability.” The law
requires that such crimes have a link to interstate commerce. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 4707 (2009).
95
Id. Division E of the Act is denominated as the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention
Act.

22

racially motivated violence is an important means of eliminating, to the extent
possible, the badges, incidents, and relics of slavery and involuntary servitude.96
Deeper reflection on the scope of the Section Two power and the meaning of the badges
and incidents of slavery will provide a basis for evaluating the constitutionality of the new hate
crimes law and, specifically, Congress‟s claims regarding race-based hate crimes. More
generally, it will assist Congress by charting a course for future Section Two legislation.
Depending on how one conceives of the badges and incidents of slavery, Section Two might be
an untapped source of broad power to address residual racial disparities and even discrimination
against other minorities. Conversely, Section Two might have few potential modern
applications. Either way, Congress will benefit immensely from renewed focus on the scope of
the Section Two power.

C. How should the judiciary evaluate Section Two legislation?
Jones set forth a very deferential standard of review for Thirteenth Amendment
legislation. Like Katzenbach v. Morgan and South Carolina v. Katzenbach, Jones indicated that
McCulloch v. Maryland should provide the basic approach for evaluating the fit between a law‟s
means and ends. However, Jones added an additional layer of deference, holding that
Congress‟s determination of the law‟s ends themselves – i.e., the identification of something as a
badge or incident of slavery – should also be reviewed solely for rationality.
In light of City of Boerne, it seems sensible to reconsider these holdings in the Thirteenth
Amendment context, whether such review leads to a reaffirmance or revision of one or both
layers of rational basis review as set forth in Jones. Questions for reflection might include: (1)
What evidentiary record should Congress have to compile to justify designating something a
96
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badge or incident of slavery? (2) With what degree of deference should a federal court review a
congressional finding that particular conduct is a badge or incident of slavery? (3) With what
degree of deference should a federal court review the means by which Congress addresses
conduct properly designated a badge or incident of slavery? (4) Is there a role for congruence
and proportionality review in the Section Two context?
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